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Abstract—Federated authentication can drastically reduce the
overhead of basic account maintenance while simultaneously
improving overall system security. Integrating with the user’s
more frequently used account at their primary organization
both provides a better experience to the end user and makes
account compromise or changes in affiliation more likely to be
noticed and acted upon. Additionally, with many organizations
transitioning to multi-factor authentication for all account access,
the ability to leverage external federated identity management
systems provides the benefit of their efforts without the additional
overhead of separately implementing a distinct multi-factor
authentication process. This paper describes our experiences and
the lessons we learned by enabling federated authentication with
the U.S. Government PKI and InCommon Federation, scaling
it up to the user base of a production HPC system, and the
motivations behind those choices. We have received only positive
feedback from our users.
Index Terms—High Performance Computing, Federated Au-
thentication, Federated Identity Management, Security, Public
Key Infrastructure, Multi-Factor Authentication, PKI
I. INTRODUCTION
The MIT Lincoln Laboratory Supercomputing Center
(LLSC) provides a high-performance computing platform to
over 1000 users at MIT across several systems and is heavily
focused on highly iterative interactive supercomputing and
rapid prototyping workloads [1], [2]. A part of the LLSC
mission is to deliver new and innovative technologies and
methods, enabling scientists and engineers to quickly ramp
up the pace of their research. By leveraging supercomputing
and big data storage assets, the LLSC has built the MIT
SuperCloud, a coherent fusion of the four largest computing
ecosystems: supercomputing, enterprise computing, big data,
and traditional databases. The MIT SuperCloud has spurred the
development of a number of cross-ecosystem innovations in
high-performance databases [3], [4], database management [5],
data protection [6], database federation [7], [8], data analytics
[9] and system monitoring [10].
The MIT Center for Engaging Supercomputing’s TX-E1 is
a research system operated by the LLSC on behalf of the
university partners of the Massachusetts Green High Perfor-
mance Computing Center (MGHPCC) [11]. Use of TX-E1
is provided to faculty, staff, and students of the five found-
ing universities and their external collaborators. We quickly
acknowledged the potential workload of account creation and
maintenance across this diverse user base and looked for ways
to improve the situation. Federated authentication seemed to
solve the most problems, allowing users to seamlessly utilize
the authentication credential from their primary organization
for access to our systems.
In this paper, we describe the tools used and process of
enabling the MIT SuperCloud Portal for federated authentica-
tion with the InCommon Federation and the U.S. Government
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the combination of which
represents millions users with ties to academic institutions or
the U.S. Government. We explore the software and method-
ology required to configure our system to accept credentials
acquired by these two providers. Finally, we describe a number
of security and user experience enhancements enjoyed by our
users as a result of this deployment, the most notable of
which is the ability to leverage robust, existing multi-factor
authentication systems deployed by their primary institutions.
While the initial focus of our efforts was various methods of
web-based access to our supercomputing facilities, including
our reverse-proxy forwarding services, we also describe a
process for self-service registration and validation of secure
shell (SSH) keys.
II. MOTIVATION
Managing a large production HPC system with an extremely
diversely affiliated user base spanning tens of unique orga-
nizations poses many obvious administrative challenges. The
implementation of federated identity management allows us to
offload a significant portion of the overhead involved in basic
account maintenance. Routine tasks which consume a large
fraction of administrator time, such as password resets, iden-
tity verification, and group membership assignment, can be
eliminated almost entirely. In addition, we also gain significant
new capabilities by tying each user’s SuperCloud account with
the account at their primary organization, including automatic
account termination if a user ends their relationship with the
organization we identify them with.
Multi-factor authentication is becoming commonplace for
Internet-connected resources. However, there are many chal-
lenges with implementing it at scale [13]. Many of the fed-
erated authentication providers available already implement,
and often even require, multi-factor authentication for all user
sign-ins. While we have not yet chosen to implement a strict
multi-factor authentication requirement on our own systems,
and will likely always maintain a pool of exempt accounts
for ad hoc classroom use, providing it as an option for the
majority of account holders was highly desirable.
Fig. 1: The Federal PKI Interoperability Diagram taken from the Defense Information Systems Agency [12] illustrates the
various interactions between the Department of Defense and external PKIs through the Federal Bridge.
We decided to integrate with two ecosystems of federated
authentication and will discuss the motivations for each one
separately.
A. InCommon Federation
The InCommon Federation is the U.S. education and re-
search identity federation that provides a network of identity
providers for cross-organizational single sign-on (SSO). More
than 1000 organizations from higher education, research labs
and sponsored partners participate [14].
The majority of accounts on our system are held by par-
ticipants in the MGHPCC community. The most common
primary organizational affiliation of the users on our system is
MIT. Touchstone is the name of MIT’s identity provider that
interfaces with the InCommon Federation. All logins to MIT
Touchstone require multi-factor authentication through Duo
[15]. Many of the other InCommon participants also integrate
with Duo, either providing it as an optionally enabled feature
or a strict login requirement.
B. U.S. Government PKI
The U.S. Government maintains a large PKI web of trust
between its various agencies and partners. Policies governing
these relationships are issued by the Federal Public Key
Infrastructure Policy Authority [16]. These policies allow for
various levels of assurance in the issued PKI credential. The
rigorousness of identity verification and the controls protecting
private key information associated with the PKI certificate
are the primary factors contributing to the level of assurance
indicated for human subscribers. These levels of assurance
policies are embedded within the issued certificate via the
inclusion of X.660 [17] object identifiers (OIDs) called policy
OIDs.
The U.S. Government has three distinct PKI programs
belonging to this ecosystem: the Department of Defense
(DoD) PKI, the Federal Common Policy (CP) PKI, and the
Federal Bridge (FB) PKI. The DoD PKI supports the Common
Access Card (CAC), which is a PKI smart card issued to
Fig. 2: MIT SuperCloud user edit page showing configuration options for mapping InCommon Federation users by their
eduPersonPrincipalName or U.S. Government-approved PKI users by their Subject Distinguished Name.
all active-duty military, reservists, civilian employees, and
many DoD contractors. Common Policy supports all U.S.
Government agencies except the DoD and issues Personal
Identity Verification (PIV) cards to all federal government
employees and contractors in support of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 12 [18]. Finally, commercial entities
may join the U.S. Government PKI ecosystem by entering
into an agreement with the Federal Bridge. Agreements exist
between these three programs so that each may accept cre-
dentials issued by either of the two others, depending on their
indicated level of assurance. An agreement need not include
all levels of assurance used by the PKIs entering into the
agreement. These agreements are expressed in a machine-
readable format through the issuance of cross-certificates,
which include an extension that maps, or declares equivalency,
between a specific policy OID of the issuer and subject PKI
program. These agreements can express unilateral or bilateral
trust, the distinction between which results in either one or
two cross-certificates being issued. This cross-certificate is
considered invalid for any policies not included in the policy
map extension, reflecting the fact that it is not covered by the
agreement between the organizations.
The result of these agreements is the large web of trust
shown in Figure 1, as seen from the Department of Defense
perspective. The DoD only accepts certificates meeting the
Federal Bridge mediumHardware assurance policy (or stricter)
which mandates identify verification using government issued
photo IDs and a hardware key storage device for the private
key. More than 5.4 million users hold active CAC or PIV cards
issued by the U.S. Government [19] under the DoD or CP PKI.
No estimates are available for the number of users holding
PKI credentials from commercial entities participating in the
FB PKI. It was clear to us that accepting PKI credentials from
this ecosystem would immediately allow a very large user base
to use their existing credentials to access our system. That the
vast majority of these credentials are multi-factor PKI smart
cards is an additional bonus.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
We decided to use the MIT SuperCloud Portal as the
cornerstone of our federated identity implementation. This
technology grew out of a prototype built for Defense Research
and Engineering (DR&E) [20]. This prototype was developed
with a view toward facilitating the use of HPC resources from
a segmented network with strict egress filtering; requirements
included the ability to authenticate with the DoD CAC, to
mount the central Lustre file system using common web
ports via the WebDAV protocol [21], and to transparently
submit HPC jobs using only these same standard ports using
interactive HPC tools. In follow-on efforts, we enhanced this
capability to add support for the Federal Common Policy and
Federal Bridge PKIs, and the ability to extract the public key
from a smart card for use with OpenSSH’s PKCS#11 option
added in 2010 (v5.4) or PuTTY-CAC [22], to provide multi-
factor SSH authentication.
The SuperCloud portal technology is based on Apache
httpd, and much of its functionality is implemented using a
custom multi-processing module (MPM) that impersonates the
web-authenticated user for all operating system calls. This ini-
tial design choice was necessary for file system access through
the mod_dav module, which provides WebDAV services, to
properly respect normal file system permissions. Conveniently,
this design means that all other functions performed by the
Apache web server, including regular web content serving,
server-side script execution such as CGI or PHP scripts, and
the watcher module described in our 2010 publication, also
run with the system permissions of the web-authenticated user.
This design ensures that users’ actions through the web portal
are limited to those they could perform if they opened an SSH
session to the system.
In order to extend the portal to accept credentials supplied
by a federated identity provider and map them to a local
system user, we needed to develop two new features: a user
interface component to prompt among a selection of multiple
authentication providers and a mirror component on the server
side to provide a pluggable interface to these providers and
performs the actual authentication. Prior to the implementation
of this project, the portal’s authentication mechanism was
built on HTTP basic access authentication backed by a Linux
pluggable authentication modules (PAM). This is one of the
simplest and most straightforward methods of authenticating
a web browser to a web server, but comes with a number
of downsides. With HTTP basic access authentication, the
username and password entered by the user is cached by
the browser and re-sent as part of the header in every HTTP
request, and, upon receipt, the server performs validation of
the user’s identity. As a result, sessions are completely non-
persistent; this is incompatible with the session persistence
required by any token-based authentication scheme. To ac-
commodate this session persistence requirement and improve
architectural flexibility, we replaced our basic authentication
framework with one based on web-form-based submission and
implemented cookie-based session tracking while maintaining
our use of Linux PAM for the initial user access verification.
As we had previously used this mechanism for our DR&E
prototype and other work that leveraged PKI smart card
authentication, we were able to reuse much of our existing
code in this implementation.
A. InCommon Federation
The InCommon Federation is implemented using Secure
Association and Markup Language (SAML) 2.0. SAML em-
ploys digitally signed XML messages passed between a ser-
vice provider (SP) and an identity provider (IdP) to authenti-
cate users. These messages typically also carry a bundle of
attributes describing the user, including remote user name,
email address, affiliation type, or other custom metadata. A
service provider may trust one or more identity providers to
authenticate its user base, generally resulting in a prompt for
the user to select the appropriate one as part of the logon
process. This SAML message exchange is depicted in Figure
3.
Entities in SAML are represented by metadata: an XML
bundle containing the public cryptographic keys used to safe-
guard the integrity and authenticity of messages, the web
addresses of SAML interfaces, entity names, and other ba-
sic information. The biggest challenge in federating SAML
between many unrelated organizational entities is arranging
discovery and exchange of this metadata. The InCommon
Federation was created to solve this problem. InCommon
centrally aggregates metadata about IdPs and SPs for all
participating members into publications that it then signs with
its own cryptographic key, providing updates following a set
schedule. Upon joining the federation, a system administrator
will statically configure the federation’s public key, metadata
download location, and update frequency. IdPs and SPs check
these lists for changes according to this configured schedule
and update their information cache once they have validated
that the cryptographic signature matches the one statically
configured for the federation.
Joining the InCommon Federation as an authorized service
provider was straightforward; as MIT is already a member,
Fig. 3: SAML 2.0 Web Browser Single Sign-on: The ser-
vice provider sends a digitally signed SAML Request to
the identity provider’s SSO service through the client web
browser using an HTTP 301 redirect. The identity provider
verifies that the service provider is authorized as part of its
network, and the identity provider returns a digitally signed
and/or encrypted SAML 2.0 response to the service provider
Assertion Consumer Service using an HTTP POST through the
client web browser. The signature and encryption certificates
are validated by using the published metadata digitally signed
by the InCommon Federation. SAML2 Browser SSO Redirect
Post by Tom Scavo is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0
becoming a subordinate entity within the greater web of trust
simply involved coordinating with the MIT InCommon point
of contact to have our SP metadata sent to InCommon for
inclusion in their scheduled publications. In our case, this SP
metadata consists of our entity name, access URL (the external
Internet address of our web portal), our contact information,
the user attributes we wish to be sent, and our X.509 certificate.
Once published in the greater metadata feed, IdPs within
member institutions could accept login requests from their
users identifying our SP as the resource they wish to access.
The IdP can then use our requested user attributes to identify
the data that needs to be sent to our SP, the access URL to
validate the browser POST back to our SP shown in Figure 3
step 4, and the X.509 certificate to validate the digital signature
on the request and/or encrypt the response back to us.
Our first implementation task was to decide what SAML SP
software to use on our system; as the SAML standard is widely
adopted for federated identity management, there are myriad
commercial and open-source products available to choose
from. We chose the open-source SimpleSAMLphp project be-
cause our login processes were already written in PHP and the
product is well supported by a team led by UNINETT, a state-
owned company responsible for Norway’s National Research
and Education Network. We realized that it would be trivial
to integrate this framework into our existing workflow and
allow users to choose their preferred authentication method,
verify their identity, and establish session persistence using
cookies. Many of the other SAML authentication alternatives
we investigated were deeply integrated with Apache and would
deliver a great deal less implementation flexibility.
Configuring SimpleSAMLphp was pleasingly straightfor-
ward. To establish our service provider, we generated a key
pair with an associated self-signed X.509 certificate and con-
figured SimpleSAMLphp to set our server name, description,
and contact information to embed in the SP metadata. Next,
we configured the InCommon Federation metadata to auto-
matically refresh on a set schedule using the metadata signing
key and the download URL of the feed. We added a new
button to our login page that imported the SimpleSAMLphp
class and called the requireAuth() function followed by
getAttributes(), at which point we’re able to test if the
eduPersonPrincipalName attribute is present and check its
value against our local user account database seeking a match
for a local system user name.
Next, we needed a method of populating the eduPerson-
PrincipalName in our local user database. For the MIT users
who made up the bulk of our initial testers, this task was
trivial: the value of this attribute was always the same as
their email address. Unfortunately, we found that this was not
true for many of our partner organizations, many of which
either use a different identifier for this field, often a randomly
generated string. We found that the fastest way to onboard
these users is to have them attempt a login to our system,
fail, and have a privileged user manually review an error
log which provides sufficient information for us to identify
the user and their associated eduPersonPrincipalName. Once
validated, they then manually copy the value from the log
to the ts_principal field of user’s account, named after MIT’s
InCommon IdP service Touchstone, as shown in Figure 2.
We encountered an unexpected challenge early in the roll-
out of this system to the greater SuperCloud community: Many
organizational identity providers are configured to disregard
any list of requested attributes described earlier over concerns
for their users’ privacy. In these cases, the remote identity
providers relay back only an informational message containing
an empty set of attributes and the indication that an anonymous
valid user from that organization had successfully logged in,
with no hint to which user from that organization it was. The
InCommon Federation acknowledged this problem and created
the Research and Scholarship Entity Category (R&S) [23] in
response, designating SPs that are "operated for the purpose of
supporting research and scholarship interaction, collaboration
or management." This category defines a more limited set of
attributes that should be released by all participating IdPs for
SPs with the R&S endorsement. Management of the R&S
category has transitioned from InCommon to a Research and
Education FEDerations group (REFEDS) working group to
standardize the definition among the different research and
education identity federations around the world. At the time
of this writing, roughly one-third of the IdPs in the InCommon
Federation support the R&S category attribute release.
Applying for inclusion in the R&S category was as straight-
forward as our initial enrollment in the federation and effec-
tively solved all remaining issues for the roughly one-third of
the IdPs in the InCommon Federation that support the R&S
category attribute release. For the remaining IdPs that do not
automatically release needed attributes upon request or honor
the R&S category, we have needed to individually contact
the IdP point of contact at each specific entity to request
permission, typically upon first acceptance of a user account
request from a member of that organization. This has thus
far been a simple, albeit manual process, never taking more
than a few days. Every organization we have worked with
has enabled the release globally and not on a per-user basis;
subsequent user sign-ups from the same organization are able
to proceed without manual intervention.
B. PKI
PKI client certificate authentication, including the optional
use of a smart card for storage of the private key, is built into
all modern web browsers. A configurable option is available
to servers whereby, as part of the TLS handshake, they may
request that clients present an X.509 certificate as a means of
client identification in addition to the mandatory process of
the server sending the client a certificate to identify itself. We
chose to use a separate virtual host with its own unique sub-
domain name for this purpose because of the inconsistency
with which different web servers and browsers handle per-
directory TLS renegotiation. Once the SuperCloud Portal was
converted to use cookie-based session tracking, we simply
needed to reintegrate existing code for PKI-X based certificate
authentication from our previously mentioned work.
The PKI standards have supported cross-certificates and
policy mapping since 1999 [24]. The potential for cross-
certificates creates multiple valid paths between an end-user
certificate and self-signed trust anchors. Discovering, building,
and validating these paths, a process known as path discovery
and path validation, can be very difficult. Implicit in the
web-of-trust nature of PKI federations, bidirectional cross-
certificates are to be expected, creating the possibility of
loops in the certificate chains. Revoked and reissued cross-
certificates further complicate the possibilities. Many applica-
tions, including Apache httpd, do not implement a path discov-
ery and validation algorithm capable of correctly processing
complex PKI federations.
Previous efforts undertaken in this area used statically
configured certificate path discovery, and we reapplied that
strategy here. While not ideal, as the PKI standard envisioned
path discovery being a dynamic activity, we found the volatil-
ity of the PKI certificate paths in organizations we worked with
to be very low and quite manageable to address with a static
configuration. A static certificate path discovery configuration
provides benefits in speed and simplicity of implementation,
with the downside of this approach being that manual inter-
vention is required for the first user of a new organization
that has a valid cross-certificate in the U.S. Government PKI
ecosystem that we have not previously configured.
Our approach to path discovery was further motivated by its
potential simplification of our second challenge: path valida-
tion. Certificate path validation involves checking the digital
signature and certificate revocation status of all certificates
involved in an authentication request, beginning with the end-
user’s certificate and proceeding until we reach a configured
trust anchor. There are two possible methods of querying
the revocation status of a certificate: a certificate revocation
list (CRL), which provides a complete list of all invalidated
certificates issued by that certificate authority, and the Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), which allows for interac-
tive queries regarding the status of a specific certificate. The
uniform resource identifier for either or both of these methods
can be listed in the issued certificate.
Our current implementation only supports the older, but
more ubiquitous, CRL method. By choosing to use CRLs
for path validation along with statically configured paths, we
are able to download all the necessary revocation information
in advance into a local cache, eliminating any background
download tasks that could delay the user’s interactive login. As
some of the Department of Defense CRLs, in particular, have
grown excessively large in the past because of the size of the
DoD PKI user base, these download delays could potentially
result in an unpleasantly sluggish user login experience during
peak times if they are not mitigated with a local cache.
The final step is the ability to map valid certificates
presented by existing users to their associated accounts on
our system. We map these certificates to accounts using the
Subject Distinguished Name (SDN) field embedded within the
certificate. Similarly to the way we handled new InCommon
registrations, here we also found that the fastest way for
users to inform us of their certificates’ SDN is to have them
attempt to log in, fail, and have that failure deliver sufficient
information for us to identify users. Privileged users are
provided with tools to quickly associate this metadata provided
by failed logins with existing system users, as shown in Figure
2. While other methods exist, such as looking up a user in the
DoD PKI 411 database or instructing the user how to navigate
the user interface to discover this information, in practice these
methods have always proven to be less time efficient.
C. Secure Shell Access
We have seen user demand for Secure Shell (SSH) access
to our systems decline over time. While still required for the
majority of users, it is no longer the absolute requirement
it once was. Through our web-based portal, users have the
ability to launch Jupyter Notebooks, Accumulo databases,
and virtual machines [25], and in the context of a running
Jupyter Notebook or Lab session, users can access a web-based
terminal window that behaves very similarly to a SSH session.
We also provide the ability to securely forward arbitrary web
applications running on compute resources out through the
portal, while simultaneously preventing inadvertent or unau-
thorized access with a user-based firewall on the internal HPC
network [26]. Users can access the web services they launch
through our forwarding proxy by using either a subdirectory
URL rewriting scheme, if supported by their web service, or
a sub-domain forwarding for the growing list of web services
that do not. This combination of access methods fully satisfies
the needs of a growing fraction of our user base.
Our policy for SSH access has always been to require
the use of public key authentication. Prior to this federated
authentication effort, users needed to email our support team a
copy of their public key for addition to the system to establish
their initial access. Using the impersonation ability of the
portal, it was trivial to write a self-service web page providing
the ability for users to edit their own SSH authorized_keys file
once they authenticated with their federated identity. This web
portal also allows us to sanity check the submitted keys for
appropriate cryptographic strength and known weaknesses in
generation [27], [28].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper details an effort to integrate with two large
authentication ecosystems that provide external identity ver-
ification for millions of users. We describe our experiences
transitioning to federated authentication as our primary authen-
ticator for the MIT SuperCloud TX-E1 system’s web-based
user portal. Through our portal’s ability to impersonate the
authenticated user for system calls, we are able to provide web-
based remote access to users’ files via the WebDAV protocol
and the ability for them to interactively launch arbitrary HPC
jobs. The portal’s forwarding reverse proxy technology allows
for seamless access to users’ custom web applications running
on the cluster, while enforcing security though integration with
our user-based firewall. While we notice an increasing fraction
of our user base no longer requests SSH access to the cluster,
users are also provided the option to register and manage SSH
public keys associated with their account in a self-service
manner. The combination of these capabilities results in a
high-productivity environment to users of all HPC experience
levels.
By having users authenticate with their existing creden-
tials from their primary organization, we have eliminated
most of the administrative overhead involved in user account
management from our team and removed users’ burden of
maintaining separate credentials. We have also enhanced the
security of our system by taking advantage of the existing
multi-factor authentication systems deployed by some of these
organizations. Ninety-three percent of our active user base,
defined as having submitted an HPC job in the last six
months and excluding temporary classroom accounts, have
been enrolled for federated authentication, and all new user
accounts are created with federated authentication enabled. We
have received only positive feedback from our users.
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